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Abstract. The paper is devoted to the current issue of the counteracting 
cyberattacks in the banking sector, in particular in the field of e-banking. The 
main types of banking fraud, which are carried out in the online sphere, are 
considered. The authors propose a mathematical model that describes the process 
of counteracting e-banking fraud. Proposed model is based on the classic Lotka-
Volterra model with logistic growth and the Holling-Tanner dynamic models. 
The fixed points of a dynamic system were calculated and analyzed. It was 
determined that there are 4 possible types of fixed points: saddle and the line of 
stable fixed points, which are unlikely may be in real life, stable node and a stable 
degenerate node, which are, in practice, the most likely cases. The constructed 
model could be used for theoretical study, different simulation experiments with 
changing input parameters could be done. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
investigate this question on real data, since the statistics on cyberattacks are 
closed.  
Keywords: e-commerce, e-banking, fraud, e-banking fraud, fraudulent attack, 
cyberattack. 
1 Introduction  
The lack of proper attention to the security of online operations can make them 
vulnerable to criminals. 
Today, most financial transactions are carried out via the Internet. The development 
of e-commerce has led to the fact that these trends have spread to the banking sector. 
Since the beginning of the 80’s, the term “e-banking” has entered the economic 
terminology. 
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Due to the flow of funds through the Internet communication channels, fraudsters, 
who are coming up with more and more new cyberattacks schemes, have become more 
active. With the advent of new cyberattacks, new countering instruments are emerging. 
The study of this issue, although it is relevant, but, unfortunately, is at a basic level. 
This is due to the fact that, in the first place, all information about cyberattacks that are 
carried out in the banking sector is confidential. 
At the same time, it is theoretically and practically justified that the emergence of 
new fraudulent schemes leads to the development of new instruments to combat them. 
Thus, there is a kind of race that can go on forever. 
Thus, scientists are faced with the task of studying the dynamics of the emergence 
of cyberattacks in the banking sector and the development of instruments of 
counteracting e-banking fraud. This article proposes to develop a mathematical model 
that would describe the process. 
2 The Concept of E-banking 
Innovative development of the economy of any country depends on the direction of 
society to the information space. Nowadays the main direction of innovation in the 
business is the transfer of commercial activity in the Internet space. Every year, from 
30% to 70% of business in any country (regardless of its level of development) goes 
into on-line sphere. That is, companies are increasingly using e-commerce systems to 
conduct business. 
The beginning of the Internet economy can be associated with the breakthrough of 
the World Wide Web system in the mid-1990s. Today, to describe economic relations 
on the Internet, the concept of “electronic commerce” is used, which is a part of the 
Internet economy. Thus, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
provides such definition of this term (in a broad sense): any form of business 
relationship where interaction between actors occurs using Internet technologies [1]. 
Finally, e-commerce could be defined as a relationship aimed at making a profit, 
carried out remotely using information and telecommunication systems, as a result of 
which participants have rights and obligations of a property nature [2]. 
In general, e-commerce is subdivided into: Electroniс Data Interchange (EDI); 
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT); e-trade; e-cash; e-marketing; e-insurance; and, 
finally, e-banking. 
E-banking is a remote banking technology that gives the ability to receive banking 
services via the Internet [3]. To connect the client to the Internet banking system it is 
enough to have access to the global network, installed on the computer browser 
program, enter into a contract with the bank, get a set of passwords or special devices 
for logging in and operations, go to the secure page of the e-banking, sign up and 
connect to the system. 
Traditionally, e-banking includes such operations: carry out banking operations on 
any computer connected to the Internet; pay for cable and satellite television, mobile 
communication operators, telephony; online games; to make utility payments; receive 
extracts about the movement of funds by card or account in the last few days, calendar 
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month, another arbitrary time period; open deposit; repay the loan; carry out transfer of 
funds between own accounts; various credit card transactions; view currency rates, 
bank announcements; submit applications for purchase / sale / currency conversion; 
blocking a card by a customer, for example, in case of theft or loss etc. 
According to statistics, more than 80% of all banking operations can be done by a 
person sitting at a computer at home or at the office. Benefit from this kind of activity 
is received by all involved persons: clients of banks, banks, software developers and 
owners of companies representing their products and services on the Internet. 
At the same time, the intensification of financial activities through the Internet leads 
to the fact that a large amount of personal information, including financial, passes 
through communication channels. This, in turn, leads to increasing e-banking fraud. 
3 Types of E-banking Fraud 
Nowadays, the development of various fraud schemes has reached a global level. In 
connection with the development of information technology, fraudsters are moving to 
a new level, organizing cyberattacks on automated systems of various companies and 
enterprises. 
Cyberattacks penetrated absolutely all areas of business. The Fig. 1 shows 5 areas of 
business that have suffered the greatest costs due to cyber fraud in August 2018.  
Fig. 1 shows that the most unprofitable cyberattacks were for the financial sector. At 
the same time, about 90% of the attacks fall on the banking sector. Especially active 
frauds are held in the field of electronic banking. 
 
Fig. 1. Average annual costs caused by global cybercrime as of August 2018, by industry sector 
(in million U.S. dollars). [5] 
The most common type of fraud in the e-banking sector today is phishing and its 
subspecies (Fig. 2). 
Generally, phishing could be defined as a scalable act of deception whereby 
impersonation is used to obtain information from a target [4]. 
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Fig. 2. Types of cyberattacks experienced by companies worldwide as of August 2018. [5] 
More precisely, phishing is a form of social engineering in which an attacker, also 
known as a phisher, attempts to fraudulently retrieve legitimate users’ confidential or 
sensitive credentials by mimicking electronic communications or phone calls from a 
trustworthy or public organization in an automated fashion [6]. 
In general, there are 2 basic phishing principles: 
─ on a mobile phone, sometimes not even tied to an account, the bell of a bank 
employee or even his security service rings. The client is told about the dubious 
movements on the card and is asked to call the CVV - the verification code of the 
card’s payment system. You should never report anything, if the call was not made 
by the client himself by the support number, any information can be used for theft. 
It is better to interrupt the call and call your bank manager yourself; 
─ a letter comes to the client's mail, signed by its servicing bank. The link proposed in 
the letter leads to an analogue of a personal account in which you need to enter your 
login and password. Banks never use this way of working with clients, any letters to 
personal mail with a proposal to provide personal data, card number or enter the 
username and password, signed by an employee of the bank, is always sent to a 
fraudster. 
A complete phishing attack involves three roles of phishers. Firstly, mailers send out a 
large number of fraudulent emails (usually through botnets), which direct users to 
fraudulent websites. Secondly, collectors set up fraudulent websites (usually hosted on 
compromised machines), which actively prompt users to provide confidential 
information. Finally, cashers use the confidential information to achieve a pay-out. 
Monetary exchanges often occur between those phishers [7]. The information flow is 
shown in Fig. 3. 
Phishing can also be divided into such types depending on the mechanisms used: 
─ “Man-in-the-Middle” attack – hackers place themselves between banks and 
customers while customers are using their online banking accounts [8]; 
─ deceptive phishing attack – sending false notifications through email [9]. In this type 
of phishing attack, an attacker sends email messages to users, masquerading as one 
of the bank’s representatives [10]. 
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─ pharming – this method is more complicated and works only with small banks. 
Pharming is a type of attack intended to redirect traffic to a fake Internet host. There 
are different methods for pharming attacks, among which DNS cache poisoning is 
the most common [7]. Thus, the fraudster “replaces” the real Internet bank of the 
bank with the same visually, but fake, where the client enters his data, and the 
fraudster, respectively, receives all the necessary personal data. 
─ malware-based phishing – malware is a piece of software developed either for the 
purpose of harming a computing device or for deriving benefits from it to the 
detriment of its user [11]. Malware can be used to collect confidential information 
directly, or aid other phishing techniques. 
─ phishing through PDF Documents – some key functions of a PDF programming 
language could be misused by an attacker or a hacker to design a new PDF document 
to his/her own advantage and extract the desired personal information from the 
victim [7]. 
 
Fig. 3. Phishing information flow. [7] 
Analysis of statistics on the total number of phishing attacks around the world shows 
that their number is gradually increasing (Fig. 4).  
It may me noticed that the time series has a certain frequency. This is due to the fact 
that certain instruments of counteracting existing fraudulent attacks are created. 
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However, bypassing the emerging instruments, new types of attacks are created. Thus, 
the decrease in the number of phishing attacks due to the use of counteracting 
instruments is replaced by a sharp increase in their number. 
 
Fig. 4. Number of global phishing attacks from 2012 to 2016 worldwide. [5] 
Talking about payment systems that are most often subjected to phishing attacks, the 
statistics are shown in the Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5. Distribution of global phishing attacks aimed at online payment systems as of 4st 
quarter 2016. [5] 
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Thus, phishing is distinguished as the most common type of cyberattack in e-banking. 
Thus, further the mathematical model of counteracting similar bank fraudulent attacks 
will be proposed. 
4 Mathematical Model of the Process of Counteracting Bank 
Fraud 
Modeling a process of counteracting bank fraud is a complex issue in terms of 
collecting real data. The relevant statistics are closed. In addition, a huge number of 
fraudulent schemes does not reach the level of law enforcement agencies. Therefore, 
this question can be investigated in theoretical form. 
This study proposes to simulate the process of counteracting bank fraud using a 
model of economic dynamics. So, the use of instruments to combat fraud and the 
emergence of new attacks can be compared to the classic “predator-prey” model [8]. 
 ൜
ݔ` = (ܽ − ܿ ∙ ݕ)ݔ
ݕ` = −(ܾ + ݀ ∙ ݔ)ݕ
 (1) 
where x – the number of prey; 
y – the number of predators; 
a, b, c, d – coefficients reflecting the interactions between species. 
Suppose that for our subject area, x is the number of fraudulent attacks, and y is the 
number of instruments to combat bank fraudulent attacks. 
The use of the Lotka-Volterra model with logistic growth [13] and the Holling-
Tanner model [14] allows us to propose a model of counteracting bank frauds: 
 ቊ
ݔ` = (ܽ − ݀ ∙ ݔ − ܾ ∙ ݕ)ݔ
ݕ` = −ܿ ∙ ݕ +
ଵ
௕
− ݕ
 (2) 
where x – number of fraudulent attacks at the time t; 
y – number of available tools to combat fraudulent attacks at the time t; 
a – the coefficient of natural increase in the number of fraudulent attacks; 
b – the coefficient of effectiveness of one instrument of counteracting fraudulent 
attacks; 
c – coefficient of natural decrease in the number of instruments of counteracting 
fraudulent attacks per time unit; 
d – coefficient of interspecific competition for attackers. d=1/D, where D – the 
maximum possible number of attacks. 
The next step is to find the fixed points of the system.  
On the basis of symbolic calculations, we obtain two fixed points. 
 (ݔଵ; ݕଵ) = ቀ0;
ଵ
(ଵା௖)௕
ቁ (3) 
 (ݔଶ; ݕଶ) = ቀ
(ଵା௖)௔ିଵ
(ଵା௖)ௗ
;
ଵ
(ଵା௖)௕
ቁ (4) 
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The study of the first fixed point is inappropriate from a practical point of view, since 
it is assumed that the number of fraudulent attacks equal 0. Therefore, we will 
investigate the second special point. We will linearize the model with Jacobian matrix. 
 ܬ(ݔ, ݕ) = ቀܽ − ܾ ∙ ݕ − 2 ∙ ݀ ∙ ݔ −ܾ ∙ ݔ
0 −ܿ − 1
ቁ (5) 
We replace x and y in Jacobian with the values of the second fixed point and calculate 
the trace and determinant for the received matrix. 
 ݐݎ = ܽ − ܿ −
ଶ௔ାଶ௔௖ିଶ
௖ାଵ
−
௕
௕ା௕௖
− 1 (6) 
 Δ = ܽ + ܽ ∙ ܿ − 1 (7) 
Based on the analysis of characteristic regression, the following expression was 
obtained for the discriminant: 
 ܦ = ቀܿ − ܽ +
௕
௕ା௕௖
+
ଶௗ(௔ା௔௖ିଵ)
(ଵା௖)ௗ
+ 1ቁ
ଶ
− 4 ∙ ܽ − 4 ∙ ܽ ∙ ܿ + 4 (8) 
Given the economic content of the input parameters of the proposed model, the 
discriminant can not be negative. Consequently, the roots of the characteristic equation 
can not be complex values. Moreover, given that the second root of the characteristic 
equation will always be a negative number, we can conclude that the roots of the 
characteristic equation can take the following values: 
1. real, negative, different – fixed point type is stable node; 
2. real, repeating, negative – fixed point type is stable degenerate node; 
3. real, different, with different signs – fixed point type is saddle; 
4. the first root is 0, the second is negative – fixed point type is a line of stable fixed 
points. 
In order to achieve these types of fixed points we will form the constraints that must be 
imposed on the ratio of input parameters (Table 1). 
Table 1. Type of fixed point depending on the ratio of the input parameters of the model. 
Type of fixed point The ratio of the input parameters 
Stable node 
ܽ + ܽ ∙ ܿ − 1 > 0
√ܦ
2
≠ 0
 
Stable degenerate node 
ܽ + ܽ ∙ ܿ − 1 > 0
√ܦ
2
= 0
 
Saddle ܽ + ܽ ∙ ܿ − 1 < 0 
Line of stable fixed points ܽ + ܽ ∙ ܿ − 1 = 0 
 
To carry out numerical experiments and study the behavior of the proposed model, 
we will construct an imitative model of the process of counteracting bank fraud in terms 
of system dynamics (Fig. 6). 
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Fig. 6. Stock and flow diagram for the model of the process of counteracting bank fraud. 
The structure of constructed model is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Description of diagram elements. 
Name of the diagram Element of stock and flow diagram 
Fraudulent_Attacks Stock 
Countermeasures Stock 
Fraudulent_Attacks_Changes Flow 
Countermeasures_Changes Flow 
a Parameter 
b Parameter 
c Parameter 
d Parameter 
 
The constructed diagram allowed to carry out simulation experiments, which take 
into account the various ratios of the input parameters of the proposed model of the 
process of counteracting bank fraud for obtaining fixed points of the specified types. 
The conducted simulation experiments for the saddle case have shown that the 
number of fraudulent attacks goes to zero over time, and the number of instruments to 
combat them is approaching some stationary value. 
Model experiments for the line of stable fixed points showed a case similar to a 
saddle. 
The construction of timelines and phase portraits of the proposed model for the case 
of a stable degenerate node caused the necessity of selecting the parameters in such a 
way that the discriminant of the characteristic equation assumed zero. Such a situation 
is possible only in the case when the parameter c=0. This means that the instruments to 
counteract fraudulent attacks are successful and there is no their “dead out”. But this 
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situation is not very attractive from a practical point of view. X and y, as in the case of 
a stable node, go to some stationary state. But the value of x is quite high. And it will 
be larger, the more the value of parameter a, the more new fraudulent attacks generate 
attacks that ended successfully. 
Summing up the results of computer simulation, we can conclude that from a 
practical point of view saddle case and the line of stable fixed points are more 
acceptable, since in these cases the value of x (the number of fraudulent attacks) goes 
to zero, regardless of the initial coordinates x and y (coordinates of the initial state of 
the system). So the value of a parameter must be ܽ ≤
ଵ
ଵା௖
. In terms of its economic 
content, the parameter с can take values from 0 to 1. Thus, the parameter a should vary 
from 0.5 to 1. It means that in response to every successful fraud attack, in addition at 
least one new attack must arise, which is unlikely may be in real life. As a rule, they 
arise much more. 
Accordingly, in practice, the most likely cases are a stable node and a stable 
degenerate node and should seek to reduce the value. Thus, we should seek to reduce 
the value of ݔ =
(ଵା௖)௔ିଵ
(ଵା௖)ௗ
. From this expression we can see that the most influential are 
the parameters a and d. Moreover, for a, the connection is straight, and for d is converse.  
To summarize, it can be argued that in order to obtain a more favorable situation 
from a practical point of view, it is necessary to reduce the values of the parameters a 
and c and increase the parameter d. 
5 Conclusions  
1. E-banking is an innovative part of e-commerce sphere and could be defined as a 
remote banking technology that gives the ability to receive banking services via the 
Internet. 
2. The most common type of e-banking fraudulent attack is phishing, which, in general, 
is a method of acquiring personal financial data of a bank customer with the help of 
fictitious phone calls, emails and substitution of real websites of banking institutions. 
3. In the paper a model of counteracting bank frauds based on of the Lotka-Volterra 
model with logistic growth and the Holling-Tanner model proposed. It allows to 
investigate the question of counteracting bank frauds in theoretical form. 
4. Simulation experiments, made with the usage of built model, showed that saddle 
case and the line of stable fixed points are unlikely may be in real life, because it 
means that in response to every successful fraud attack, in addition at least one new 
attack must arise. As a rule, they arise much more. In practice, the most likely cases 
are a stable node and a stable degenerate node. 
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